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Abstract 
The problem of ambiguity in games is discussed, and a class of ambiguous games is 
identified. 195 participants played strategic-form games of various sizes with 
unidentified co-players. In each case, they first chose between a known-risk game 
involving a co-player indifferent between strategies and an equivalent ambiguous 
game involving one of several co-player types, each with a different dominant 
strategy, then they chose a strategy for the preferred game. Half the players knew 
that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely, and half did not. Half 
expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week’s delay. 
Known-risk games were generally preferred, confirming a significant strategic 
ambiguity aversion effect. In the delay conditions, players who knew that the 
ambiguous co-player types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguity-
averse than those who did not. Decision confidence was significantly higher in 2 × 2 
than larger games. 
 
Keywords: ambiguity aversion; behavioural game theory; confidence; decision making; 
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Games in which players cannot assign meaningful probabilities to their co-players’ 
strategies present a major challenge to game theory and to rational choice theory in general. 
Ever since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed an axiomatic theory of expected 
utility (EU), and especially since Savage (1954/1972) presented his theory of subjective 
expected utility (SEU), game theory has rested on the fundamental assumption that a player 
can invariably assign probabilities to a co-player’s strategies. These probabilities are 
 normally interpreted as the player’s beliefs about how the co-player is likely to act in the 
game. On this basis, the theory purports to provide a comprehensive theory of rational 
interactive decision making. But everyday economic, social, political, and interpersonal 
interactions frequently present agents with interactive decisions in which meaningful 
probabilities cannot be assigned, and in these circumstances game theory is powerless to 
determine what rational agents are likely to believe. We call such games ambiguous games, 
and in this article we explore a phenomenon that we call strategic ambiguity aversion, 
defined as the tendency of human decision makers to prefer known-risk games, in which 
probabilities can reasonably be assigned to co-players’ strategies, to ambiguous games. 
A strategic game is any decision involving two or more decision makers, each with two or 
more ways of acting, and in which the outcome depends on the actions of all the decision 
makers involved. The problem of ambiguity in games has wide implications, because game 
theory plays an important theoretical role across a spectrum of social and behavioural science 
disciplines, including cognitive psychology (e.g., Colman, 2003; Hedden & Zhang, 2002); 
psychobiology (e.g., McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; Rilling, Gutman, Zeh, 
Pagnoni, Berns, & Kilts, 2002); linguistics (e.g., Dekker & van Rooy, 2000; Nowak & 
Komarova, 2001); and artificial intelligence (e.g., Bowling & Veloso, 2002; Shehory & 
Kraus, 1998). All of these fields of research, and many others, rely at times on standard 
game-theoretic ideas, including the assumption that a player can assign meaningful 
probabilities to the co-players’ strategies. The failure of this assumption in many naturally 
occurring interactive decisions creates a gap in the scope of game theory and leaves open the 
question of how human decision makers respond to ambiguous situations that arise in social, 
economic, and political strategic interactions in everyday life. 
One important clue is provided by the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion in individual 
(non-interactive) decision making. This is the robust tendency, in decisions involving risk or 
uncertainty, to prefer options in which the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes 
are known over options in which the probabilities are unknown. In conventional decision 
theory, a distinction is conventionally drawn between decision making under certainty, in 
which the agent knows in advance the outcome that will follow the choice of any available 
option, and decision making in which the agent lacks certainty about the outcomes. Decisions 
without certainty are sometimes subdivided further into decisions under risk, in which the 
agent, though lacking certainty about the outcomes, knows the outcome probabilities 
associated with the available options, and decisions under uncertainty, in which the agent is 
ignorant even of the outcome probabilities. The distinction between risk and uncertainty was 
 introduced by Knight (1921), who illustrated it with a Gedankenexperiment involving two 
people attempting to draw a red or a black ball from an urn containing both red and black 
balls: “One man knows that there are red and black balls, but is ignorant of the numbers of 
each; another knows that the numbers are three of the former to one of the latter” (pp. 218–
219). The latter faces a decision under quantifiable risk, whereas the former faces a decision 
under unquantifiable uncertainty, more commonly called ambiguity in the contemporary 
cognitive science literature. 
When confronted with a choice between a risky option and an uncertain one, a substantial 
majority of decision makers manifest ambiguity aversion by choosing the risky option. As an 
illustration of strategic ambiguity aversion – in interactive decision making – consider the 
following mundane strategic dilemmas. (a) You have arranged to meet John for lunch this 
week, and you would like to do it today. He lunches every day in one of two restaurants, a 
long way from each other, alternating daily between the two, but you have forgotten to find 
out which one he is due to visit today, and it is too late to contact him. You have time to try 
just one of the restaurants and, whichever one you choose, there is obviously a 50-50 chance 
of meeting up with him. This is a known-risk game, with a probability of success of one-half. 
(b) You have also arranged to meet Caroline for lunch this week, and you would like to do it 
today if you do not try to meet John. You know that Caroline visits the same restaurant every 
day, and that it is called Luigi’s, but there turn out to be two restaurants by that name, a long 
way from each other, and you do not know which is the one she haunts. It is too late to 
contact her. Once again, you have to choose just one of the restaurants, but in this case you 
have no way of knowing what the relevant probabilities are – you have no way of assigning 
meaningful probabilities to the options. This is an ambiguous game with unknown 
probabilities. Assuming that you would enjoy lunch equally with John or Caroline, which 
dilemma would you prefer – trying to meet John or Caroline? If ambiguity aversion applies to 
games, then you would probably prefer the known-risk game (a) involving John. 
In individual decision making, the ambiguity aversion effect was discovered 
simultaneously and independently by Ellsberg (1961) and Fellner (1961). The simplest 
empirical demonstration of it, based on Knight’s (1921) Gedankenexperiment, is usually 
called the Ellsberg paradox. Two urns are filled with red and black balls. Urn A contains 50 
red and 50 black balls, and Urn B contains an unknown ratio of 100 red and black balls. A 
decision maker chooses a colour (red or black) and an urn (A or B), and then draws a ball 
blindly from the chosen urn and wins a prize if the ball turns out to be of the chosen colour. A 
majority of decision makers strictly prefer – definitely prefer, and not merely consider 
 equally preferable – the known-risk Urn A to the ambiguous Urn B, irrespective of the chosen 
colour. 
It is not difficult to show that this violates the axioms of SEU theory as formulated by 
Savage (1954/1972). Without loss of generality, suppose a decision maker chooses red and 
strictly prefers Urn A to Urn B. Knowing that the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn 
A is 1/2, the decision maker must, according to the assumptions of SEU theory, have assigned 
a subjective probability less than 1/2 to drawing a red ball from Urn B, otherwise Urn A 
should not be strictly preferred for the prospect of drawing a red ball. This implies that the 
decision maker’s subjective probability of drawing a black ball from Urn B must be greater 
than 1/2, because the ball that is drawn must obviously be either red or black, and the two 
probabilities must therefore sum to unity. According to SEU theory, the decision maker 
should therefore prefer the prospect of drawing a black ball from Urn B to that of drawing a 
red ball from Urn A, and the strict preference for drawing a red ball from Urn A must 
therefore have been inconsistent with the decision maker’s own preferences. The decision 
maker violated SEU theory by failing to maximize SEU. In fact, ambiguity aversion violates 
not just SEU theory, but every theory of choice under uncertainty based on conventional 
probabilities. Nonetheless, a substantial majority of decision makers prefer the known-risk 
Urn A for both red and black balls, and this is evidence not only of human irrationality, at 
least as rationality is interpreted in SEU theory, but more specifically of ambiguity aversion. 
The phenomenon has been extensively studied in individual decision making and is now 
known to be both moderately powerful and robust (Camerer, 1995, pp. 644–649; Camerer & 
Weber, 1992; Curley & Yates, 1989; Frisch & Baron, 1988; Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 
1999). Ambiguity aversion has been reported even when decision makers are informed of the 
second-order probabilities associated with the ambiguous options. In Ellsberg urn choices, 
for example, ambiguity aversion has been found when the decision makers do not know the 
specific ratio of red to black balls in the ambiguous urn but know that every possible ratio is 
equally likely, or that the specific ratio was chosen randomly from a sampling frame 
containing every possible ratio, so that every ratio had an equal chance of being selected 
(e.g., Rode et al., 1999). This information enables statistically minded decision makers to 
infer the outcome probabilities, but a degree of ambiguity aversion is generally observed 
nevertheless. Even without this information, a decision maker faced with an ambiguous 
choice can invariably reformulate it as a risky choice by assigning subjective second-order 
probabilities to the raw probabilities that might apply (Gärdenfors & Sahlin, 1982, 1983; 
Marschak, 1975; Savage, 1954/1972, p. 58), at the very least by simply applying the principle 
 of insufficient reason and treating the unknown probabilities as though they were known to 
be equal (Knight, 1921, p. 219; Raiffa, 1961). However, although ambiguity can be converted 
into risk without difficulty, it is clear from the empirical evidence that ambiguity and risk 
have distinct psychological properties and quite different effects on choice behaviour. 
Several theories have been put forward to explain ambiguity aversion, but none has yet 
gained general acceptance (Camerer, 1995, pp. 644–649; Camerer & Weber, 1992; Curley, 
Yates, & Abrams, 1986; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999). We believe that ambiguity aversion is 
driven by loss of decision confidence arising from pessimism in response to uncertainty. Our 
uncertainty intolerance hypothesis is based partly on the reasonable assumption that people 
are motivated to feel confident about their judgments and decisions, and partly on clear 
evidence that uncertainty undermines confidence (Becker & Brownson, 1964; Dugas, 
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Ghosh & Ray, 1997) and induces a psychological state that 
most people find disturbing or aversive (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 
1994). Freeston et al. proposed that ambiguous situations activate an uncertainty schema that 
makes people worry and feel more anxious. Similarly, Ghosh and Ray (1997) demonstrated 
that the presence of ambiguity accentuates people’s perceptions of risk, and that decision 
makers who are less risk averse, and have more tolerance for ambiguity, display greater 
confidence in their choice. Thus, we argue that the tendency of decision makers to prefer 
known-risk to ambiguous options arises because most people tend to become more anxious 
and less confident in the face of uncertainty, and ambiguous options, almost by definition, 
involve greater uncertainty than risky options. 
 
Theoretical Modelling of Ambiguity in Games 
Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2003) modelled pessimistic and optimistic responses to 
ambiguity in dyadic games in terms of Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory, according to 
which decision makers’ beliefs or subjective probabilities are represented by neo-additive 
(non-extremal outcome additive) probabilities or capacities (see also Dow & Werlang, 1994; 
Eichberger & Kelsey, 2000, 2004). The Choquet expected utility is a essentially a weighted 
average of the minimum, maximum, and expected payoffs. According to this interpretation, 
ambiguity aversion arises when a decision maker responds to ambiguity with pessimistic 
caution, overweighting the worst possible outcome relative to SEU theory (Lopes, 1987). 
Alternative theoretical interpretations of ambiguity in games have been put forward by Lo 
(1996) and Marinacci (2000). 
 
 Experimental Modelling of Certainty, Risk, and Ambiguity in Games 
According to a fundamental rationality assumption of game theory (see, e.g., McClennen, 
1991; Sugden, 1991), players are assumed to be rational in the sense of SEU theory. This 
implies that they always choose strategies that maximize their individual SEU, relative to 
their knowledge and beliefs at the material time. SEU theory is essentially a formalization of 
the commonsense notion of instrumental rationality, according to which people have more or 
less coherent preferences and probability judgments and try to do the best for themselves, 
relative to these preferences and beliefs, in every decision that arises. An interpretation of 
SEU in terms of revealed preferences, popular in economics, asserts that a person who 
chooses A and rejects B reveals a preference of A over B and a higher utility for A than B, and 
choices therefore maximize SEU tautologically. However, most psychologists (e.g., Colman, 
2003) and some economists (e.g., Sen, 1978) believe that revealed preference theory explains 
too little, because choices are not the only indicators of preferences, and too much, because 
other factors apart from preferences influence choices. In psychology, preferences are 
therefore usually interpreted as internal attitudes that influence choices. 
A common knowledge assumption, now standard in game theory, requires the 
specification of the game, including the strategy sets and payoff functions of the players, to 
be common knowledge in the sense that every player knows it, knows that every other player 
knows it, knows that every other player knows that every other player knows it, and so on. 
This assumption was introduced by Lewis (1969, pp. 52–68) and formalized mathematically 
by Aumann (1976). 
In order to study strategic ambiguity aversion experimentally in simple dyadic games, we 
modelled strictly determined, risky, and ambiguous strategic games in terms of players’ 
knowledge and beliefs. In some games, the rationality and common knowledge assumptions 
of game theory enable Player I to predict Player II’s choice with certainty, because one of 
Player II’s strategies is uniquely rational according to SEU theory. In these circumstances, 
Player I knows what Player II will choose and therefore faces a decision under certainty, and 
the game is strictly determined. 
  
  
  II 
  C D 
I 
C 2, 1 0, 0 
D 0, 1 2, 0 
 
Figure 1. A strictly determined game in which Player I chooses under certainty. The pair of 
numbers in each cell are the payoffs to Player I (choosing between the rows) and Player II 
(choosing between the columns) in that order. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a simple example of such a game. Player I chooses one of the rows, 
Player II independently chooses one of the columns, and the four cells represent the possible 
outcomes, with the pair of numbers in each cell indicating (in units of utility) the payoffs to 
Players I and II respectively in that outcome. For example, Player I, by choosing Strategy D, 
wins nothing if Player II chooses Strategy C but wins 2 units if Player II chooses D. In this 
game, Player II has a dominant C strategy by virtue of receiving a higher payoff from 
choosing C than D irrespective of Player I’s choice. Thus, Player II, by choosing Strategy C, 
wins 1 unit whatever strategy Player I chooses, whereas by choosing strategy D, Player II 
receives a zero payoff whatever Player I chooses. Thus, the rationality and common 
knowledge assumptions imply that Player I knows what Player II will choose and therefore 
knows the outcome and corresponding payoffs that will result from choosing row C or D: 
row C will lead to a (C, C) outcome and payoffs of (2, 1); and row D will lead to a (D, C) 
outcome and payoffs of (0, 1). Because Player I seeks to maximize SEU, the outcome (C, C) 
is therefore strictly determined, and the payoffs (2, 1) are predictable with certainty – subject 
only to the standard rationality and common knowledge assumptions. The game in Figure 1 is 
clearly unambiguous. 
 
  II 
  C D 
I 
C 2, 1 0, 1 
D 0, 1 2, 1 
 
Figure 2. A risky game for Player I. 
 
In other games, Player I cannot predict Player II’s strategy with certainty but can, with 
some confidence, assign subjective probabilities, representing beliefs about how Player II 
 will act, and in those circumstances Player I faces a risky decision. Figure 2 depicts the 
simplest game of this type, with a payoff function that assigns Player II the same expected 
payoff in every outcome of the game, indicating that Player II is indifferent between the four 
possible outcomes. The rationality and common knowledge assumptions do not specifically 
require Player II to choose between the columns using a (1/2, 1/2) mixed strategy – a random 
strategy choice using predetermined probabilities, in this case equal, implemented by tossing 
a coin, for example – nor do they require Player I to adopt the belief that Player II is equally 
likely to choose either strategy (C or D). Contemporary game theory requires merely that a 
player’s strategies should be rationalizable in the sense of being justified in terms of 
consistent beliefs, including beliefs about the co-player’s beliefs (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 
1984), but it seems natural for Player I to assign equal subjective probabilities to Player II’s 
strategies and, assuming that the labelling of strategies is arbitrary, it would be difficult to 
find a reasoned basis for any other belief by Player I about Player II’s likely behaviour. 
Under the natural equal-probability assumption, Player I faces a risky decision, with an 
expected payoff from a C choice of (1/2)(2) + (1/2)(0) = 1, and similarly from a D choice of 
(1/2)(0) + (1/2)(2) = 1. This game is risky rather than ambiguous. 
We model ambiguous games with the notion of incomplete information, according to 
which players are assumed to be ignorant of their co-players’ preferences. The specification 
of such games requires a refinement of the standard common knowledge assumption of 
classical game theory. To model games of incomplete information, Harsanyi (1967–1968) 
introduced a theory of Bayesian games, in which incomplete information is transformed into 
complete information by introducing a fictitious player representing chance. In a two-player 
game in which Player I is ignorant of Player II’s preferences, the Harsanyi transformation 
involves defining as many Player II types as are possible, each with a different payoff 
function representing the preferences that Player II might have. Player I’s ignorance of Player 
II’s preferences is modelled by specifying all the Player II preference patterns that Player I 
considers possible, with a probability assigned to each according to how likely Player I 
considers it to be. Chance makes the first move in a Bayesian game by selecting one of the 
Player II types, each type having a predetermined probability of being selected according to 
the subjective probability that Player I assigns to it, and then Players I and II choose their 
strategies independently in the usual way. Player I is ignorant of which payoff matrix has 
been selected by chance, but the probabilities associated with the Player II types are assumed 
to be common knowledge in the game, and this transformation thus reduces any game of 
incomplete information to one accessible to standard analytic techniques applicable to games 
 of complete information. The idea generalizes straightforwardly to both players, if both have 
incomplete information, and to multi-player games. 
 
  II    II 
  C D    C D 
I 
C 2, 1 0, 0  
I 
C 2, 0 0, 1 
D 0, 1 2, 0  D 0, 0 2, 1 
 
Figure 3. An ambiguous game in which Player I does not know which of the two payoff 
matrices governs Player II’s actions, and Player I therefore chooses under uncertainty. 
 
The probabilities associated with Player II types are endogenous variables in Bayesian 
game theory, in the sense that they are not inherent in the specification of a game but arise 
from a player’s subjective response to it, and ambiguous cases can arise as in the dilemma of 
lunch with Caroline outlined earlier. Figure 3 depicts a simple ambiguous game in which, 
from Player I’s perspective, two Player II types are possible. This models a game in which 
Player I knows that Player II will be one of these two types but, we assume, does not know 
their respective probabilities. Player I’s payoffs are identical in both matrices, as in a 
conventional Bayesian game. The Player II type on the left has a strictly dominant C strategy, 
because that player is certain, by choosing C, to receive a payoff of 1, and by choosing D, a 
payoff of zero, irrespective of Player I’s choice. The Player II type on the right has a strictly 
dominant D strategy, because here Player II’s choice of D guarantees a payoff of 1 and C a 
payoff of zero, irrespective of Player I’s choice. Player I chooses a strategy without knowing 
which type is in the role of Player II, and therefore which payoff matrix applies, and in these 
circumstances Player I may be assumed to face an ambiguous choice with unknown 
probabilities. 
 
Rationale of the Experiment 
We have shown how decision making under certainty, risk, and ambiguity can be 
modelled in interactive decisions, using game-theoretic assumptions and devices. This invites 
the essentially empirical question as to whether ambiguity aversion influences interactive 
behaviour. We report below an experiment designed to answer this question and to throw 
further light on the nature and scope of ambiguity aversion in human judgment and choice. In 
the experiment, players were presented with sequences of problems, in each of which they 
 had to choose between taking the role of Player I in a risky game of complete information, 
similar to the one displayed in Figure 2, and taking the role of Player I in an ambiguous game 
of incomplete information, similar to Figure 3. In each case, the decision maker chose 
between playing a known-risk game, with outcome probabilities that could reasonably be 
inferred, and playing an ambiguous game with unknown outcome probabilities. On the basis 
of evidence from individual decision making, we hypothesized that strategic ambiguity 
aversion would cause most players to prefer the known-risk games. 
To test our uncertainty intolerance interpretation of ambiguity aversion, we examined the 
effects of time delay on strategic choices. Half the players made their choices after being told 
that a lottery would take place and the winner would receive a cash payment immediately 
after the experimental session, and the other half after being told that they would have to wait 
a week for the lottery before discovering whether they had won the cash reward. We 
predicted that ambiguity aversion would be greater in the delay conditions, because the 
aversive psychological effects of uncertainty that underlie ambiguity aversion, according to 
our interpretation of the phenomenon, are prolonged when the outcome is delayed. It seems 
reasonable to expect decision makers to be more strongly motivated to avoid an aversive state 
if it is expected to last a long time, because it would entail more unpleasantness. To provide 
further information about the putative role of confidence in ambiguity aversion, players rated 
their confidence after every choice between a known-risk and an ambiguous option. 
To determine whether strategic ambiguity aversion occurs when second-order 
probabilities are known, we informed half the participants that the Player II types in the 
ambiguous option were equally likely and withheld this information from the others. We 
predicted that significantly more ambiguity aversion would occur when players were not 
informed of these second-order probabilities, partly because that is what has been found in 
individual decision making, and partly because uncertainty is self-evidently more profound 
when even the second-order probabilities are unknown. 
In order to examine the effects of matrix size on strategic ambiguity aversion, we 
presented participants with choices involving 2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 4 × 4 games. We predicted 
greater ambiguity aversion in choices involving larger games, because ambiguity tends to 
increase with the number of possible outcomes. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 195 undergraduate students (160 women and 35 men), with a 
mean age of 19.84 years (SD = 0.92, range 19 to 24). These participants were assigned to the 
 role of Player I and were rewarded according to a variant of the random lottery incentive 
system (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998). Five additional participants were assigned to play 
the role of Player II – this was the fewest possible Player IIs, because the 4 × 4 games 
required one Group A and four Group B Player II types, and we needed at least one 
participant to fill the role of each. A prize of up to £81 was awarded to one participant, 
selected by lottery, the actual payment being calculated according to the payoffs that the 
player accumulated over nine games. In the event, the lottery-winning Player I earned £40. 
Whenever Player I chose an ambiguous option, one of the four participants in the role of 
Player II was selected randomly as the co-player. The data reported below refer only to the 
choices of players in the role of Player I. 
 
Materials 
Each participant in the role of Player I took part in three 2 × 2, three 3 × 3, and three 4 × 4 
games. An example of a choice involving 2 × 2 games, as it was presented to the players, is 
shown in Figure 4. On each trial, participants in the role of Player I were told that they were 
free to choose whether to be paired with a Player II from Group A or one of the specified 
Player II types from Group B. In every Group A game, the payoffs were chosen to indicate 
that Player II had no preferences between the column strategies, given the absence of any 
preferences of Player I between the row strategies. Player II’s payoff function was thus flat in 
the sense that it yielded the same expected (average) payoff irrespective of the column 
strategy chosen. Group A therefore represented a known-risk option for Player I, because 
equal probabilities could reasonably be assigned to Player II’s strategies. In Group B, each of 
the specified Player II types had a different strictly dominant strategy, but Player I did not 
know which Player II type would be chosen and, even at the time of choosing a strategy, 
Player I did not know which of the payoff matrices in Group B would determine Player II’s 
payoffs. Group B therefore represented an ambiguous option for Player I. The known-risk 
option A and the ambiguous option B were strategically equivalent in every case. All nine 
games used in the experiment (known-risk and ambiguous options) are shown in summary 
form in the appendix. 
  
  
A 
  II 
  C D 
I 
C 8, 4 0, 4 
D 0, 4 8, 4 
 
B      
  II   II 
  C D   C D 
I 
C 8, 4 0, 0   8, 0 0, 4 
D 0, 4 8, 0   0, 0 8, 4 
 
Figure 4. Game 1, as it was presented to the players. Players first chose between the known-
risk version A, and the ambiguous version B, and then chose between Strategies C or D. 
 
Design and Procedure 
An independent-groups experimental design was used to investigate the effects of 
information, time delay, and matrix size on choice behaviour (known-risk versus ambiguous 
option choice), on strategy choices, and on self-rated decision confidence. The confidence 
ratings were intended to provide an indication of the participants’ beliefs that they had chosen 
the best options. The experiment was completed in a 45-minute experimental session. 
For each of the nine games, participants in the role of Player I were presented with a 
standard forced-choice decision task in which they were free to choose either a known-risk or 
an ambiguous option. Half the participants, in the no-delay conditions, were told that, 
immediately after the experimental session, they would be entered into a prize lottery and the 
winner would be paid in cash, up to £81, depending on their payoffs accumulated during the 
experiment. The rest of the participants, in the one-week delay conditions, were given the 
same information, apart from being told that there would be a delay of one week after the 
experimental session before the prize lottery and cash payment. 
With two levels of information about the distribution of Player II types (equally-
likely/any-distribution) and two levels of delay (one-week-delay/no-delay), there were four 
treatment conditions. Within each of those conditions, we presented the two options (known-
risk/ambiguous) in counterbalanced order, so that half of the participants saw each 
ambiguous option above and half saw it below its known-risk counterpart. To control for 
 labelling and positional effects, we also transposed the rows and columns of each payoff 
matrix systematically, so that different players saw the matrices in different layouts and 
positions on the page. 
Participants, were randomly assigned to the four treatment conditions, and they began by 
filling in consent forms and providing demographic and contact details. Those assigned to the 
equally-likely, no-delay treatment conditions then read the following written instructions: 
 
On your questionnaire is a participant number, which corresponds to a raffle ticket that is in a “hat.” In 
a few minutes time, when everyone has finished the experiment, raffle tickets will be drawn out of the “hat” 
and if you are selected you will get the opportunity to come to the front of the room and the decisions that 
you will by then have made on the questions below will be paid in cash. 
The choices that you make will influence the amount of money that you are eligible to receive, so 
please think carefully about your decisions. 
You will be Person I, on the left of the grid. Your cash payoffs are shown in the grid on the LEFT of 
each box in bold italics. The person that you are paired with will be Person II at the top. THEIR cash 
payoffs are shown on the right of each box. So in the example below if you choose C and they choose D 
then you are paid £2 and they are paid £1.  
 
 II 
 C D 
I 
C 5,  3 2,  1 
D 1,  2 4,  4 
 
In the room there are 2 groups of people that you can be paired up with: 
In one of the groups everyone has been given the same grid to look at and they will win money 
whichever column they choose. 
In the other group the grids have been given out so that there are equal numbers of people with each 
type of grid. There are different grids and you will be shown what they are. You don’t know which person 
you will get paired with and which grid they will be looking at. 
You will be randomly assigned a partner from the group you have chosen by a computer. Your 
payments will then be worked out by looking at the choices you both made for that game. 
Once you have decided which group of people you want the computer to select you a partner from you 
can then decide which of the rows you wish to choose. 
 
Minor alterations were made to these instructions for the other treatment conditions. In 
the one-week-delay conditions, the last part of the second sentence was altered to read: “if 
you are selected you will get the opportunity to come to the front of the room at the start of 
next week’s lecture and the decisions that you have made on the questions below will then be 
 paid in cash.” In the any-distribution information conditions, in which Player I was not told 
that Player II types were equally likely, the third sentence below the displayed payoff matrix 
was altered to: “In the other group the grids have been given out and there are different 
numbers of people with each type of grid. There are different grids and you will be shown 
what they are, but not told how many people have each grid. You don’t know which person 
you will get paired with and which grid they will be looking at.” All participants were told 
that the payoffs represented pounds sterling. 
Games 1–9 were presented in fully counterbalanced order on separate sheets after the 
instruction sheet. For each game, the participants were asked the following three questions: 
Would you prefer to be paired with a person from Group A or Group B? Using a scale from 0 
(not at all confident) to 100 (totally confident), and using any number to represent your 
confidence, how confident are you that you have picked the group that will give you the best 
chance of winning? You are Person I on the left. Which of the rows do you wish to choose? 
The five additional participants (not counted in our tally of 195 Player I participants) were 
assigned to play the role of Player II. One served as Player II for all choices of Group A 
(known-risk options), and this participant saw only the single known-risk payoff matrix for 
each of the nine games. Four participants served as Player II in Group B (the ambiguous 
options), and each of these players saw only one of the ambiguous option payoff matrices. 
We did not tell our participants how many people were in each group, hence the sizes of the 
groups were ambiguous, but they could have been assumed to be large, given that there were 
200 people in the room. The strategy choices of the participants assigned to the role of Player 
II were used to determine their own payoffs and those of the participants in the role of Player 
I, including the lottery prizewinning Player I, whose payoffs were subsequently converted to 
cash. 
The main dependent variable, ranging from 0 to 9, was the number of times that the 
ambiguous option was chosen over the nine games by each Player I. We also calculated the 
number of times the ambiguous option was chosen in the 2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 4 × 4 games 
(across the within-subjects factor), yielding scores between 0 and 3 for each matrix size. Self-
rated decision confidence ranged from 0 to 100 for each Player I decision. 
 
Results 
Ambiguity Aversion 
Ambiguous options were chosen in 41% of games, whereas the known-risk option was 
chosen in 59% of the games, confirming a significant, medium-sized ambiguity aversion 
 effect in interactive decisions, t(194) = 4.16, p < .001, effect size d = .60. Game-by-game 
results are shown in Figure 7. They reveal that known-risk games were preferred to 
ambiguous games in the overwhelming majority of cases, in line with our strategic ambiguity 
aversion hypothesis. Table 1 confirms that when the Player I participants were informed that 
their Player II co-player types were equally likely, six of the nine games showed differences 
in the direction of ambiguity aversion, although game-by-game significance tests produced a 
significant effect (beyond p < .05) only for Game 7. The mean ambiguity aversion effect size 
w (for association) in this condition is negligible (w = .05). However, when the participants 
were informed that any distribution of Player II types was possible, differences were in the 
hypothesized direction in all cases and highly significant ambiguity effects occurred in seven 
of the nine games (Games 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9), with a mean effect size of w = .21 (between 
“small” and “medium”, according to Cohen, 1992). 
A 2 × 2 × 3 analysis of variance (Delay × Information × Matrix Size), with repeated 
measures on the last factor, was performed on the ambiguous choice data. The main effect of 
delay was non-significant, F(1, 191) = 2.72, p = .10, ns. The main effect of information was 
significant, F(1, 191) = 5.47, p = .02, effect size (partial eta squared) ηp2 = .03 (small). 
Participants who were informed that the ambiguous option contained “equal numbers of 
people with each type of grid” were more likely to choose the ambiguous option (M = 1.39/3 
= 46.30%) than those who were told merely that the ambiguous option contained “different 
grids and you will be shown what they are, but not told how many people have each grid” (M 
= 1.09/3 = 36.27%). This effect should be interpreted in the light of a significant Delay × 
Information interaction (see Figure 5), indicating that participants who were informed that the 
Player II types in the ambiguous options were equally likely were significantly less 
ambiguity-averse than those who had no information about the Player II probabilities, but this 
difference was significant in the one-week-delay conditions (Ms = 1.62/3 = 54.07% and 
1.07/3 = 35.57% respectively) and not in the no-delay conditions (Ms = 1.16/3 = 38.53% and 
1.11/3 = 36.97% respectively): F(1, 191) = 3.91, p = .049, ηp2 = .02 (small). Supplementary 
analysis confirmed that information was a significant factor in the one-week-delay 
conditions, F(1, 93) = 7.85, p = .006, ηp2 = .08 (medium), but not in the no-delay conditions, 
F(1, 98) = 0.08, ns. 
 
 Table 1 
Choices of Known-risk and Ambiguous Options Over Nine Games by Participants Informed 
that Player II Types were Equally Likely or were Drawn from Any Distribution 
  Option Chosen    
Game  Known-risk Ambiguous χ2 p Effect size w 
Equally Likely      
1  50 (55.56%) 40 (44.44%) 1.11 .292 .08 
2  51 (56.67%) 39 (43.33%) 1.60 .206 .09 
3  52 (57.78%) 38 (42.22%) 2.18 .140 .11 
4  51 (56.67%) 39 (43.33%) 1.60 .206 .09 
5  43 (47.78%) 47 (52.22%) 0.18 .673 –.03 
6  41 (45.56%) 49 (54.44%) 0.71 .399 –.06 
7  57 (63.33%) 33 (36.67%) 6.40 .011 .18 
8  41 (45.56%) 49 (54.44%) 0.71 .399 –.06 
9  49 (54.44%) 41 (45.56%) 0.71 .399 .06 
Any Distribution     
1  59 (56.19%) 46 (43.81%) 1.61 .205 .09 
2  67 (63.81%) 38 (36.19%) 8.01 .005 .21 
3  72 (68.57%) 33 (31.43%) 14.49 .001 .28 
4  71 (67.62%) 34 (32.38%) 13.04 .001 .26 
5  53 (50.48%) 52 (49.52%) 0.01 .922 .00 
6  65 (61.90%) 40 (38.10%) 5.95 .015 .18 
7  71 (67.62%) 34 (32.38%) 13.04 .001 .26 
8  77 (73.33%) 28 (26.67%) 22.87 .001 .39 
9  67 (63.81%) 38 (36.19%) 8.01 .005 .21 
Mean   115 (58.97%) 80 (41.03%)    
 
  
 
Figure 5. Two-way interaction of Delay × Information for ambiguity aversion. 
 
A small but significant effect of matrix size on ambiguity aversion (proportions of 
ambiguous strategy choices) was found: F(2, 382) = 3.89, p = .02, ηp2 = .02. A posteriori 
multiple comparisons showed that there was less ambiguity aversion in 3 × 3 games (M = 
1.34/3 = 44.67%) than 2 × 2 games (M = 1.20/3 = 40.00%), and less in 3 × 3 games than 4 × 
4 games (M = 1.14/3 = 38.00%). No two-way or three-way interactions between delay, and 
information, and matrix size were significant. 
 
Strategy Choices 
In four of the nine games (Games 1, 3, 7, and 8, see Appendix), Player I’s strategy 
choices differed significantly between the known-risk and ambiguous versions of the games, 
and in two more (Games 2 and 4), the differences were marginally significant (.05 < p < .10). 
In Game 1 (shown in Figure 4), for example, Player Is who opted for the known-risk version 
preferred Strategy C in 75.23% of choices and Strategy D in 24.77%, while those Player Is 
who opted for the ambiguous version preferred Strategy C in 55.81% of choices and Strategy 
D in 44.19%, χ2(1) = 8.15, p = .004, w = 0.20 (small to medium). Similar significant 
associations between known risk or ambiguity and strategic choice, with small to medium 
effect sizes, were found in one other 2 × 2 game, in one 3 × 3 game, and in two 4 × 4 games. 
Among those who selected the known-risk options, a clear majority tended to prefer one or 
other of the available strategies, whereas among those who chose the ambiguous options, 
preferences were more evenly spread more evenly among the strategies. 
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A significant and large effect of matrix size on self-rated decision confidence was found: 
F(2, 382) = 59.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. A posteriori multiple comparisons revealed that 
confidence was significantly higher in the 2 × 2 games (M = 53.48) than in the 3 × 3 games 
(M = 46.83), and also significantly higher in the 2 × 2 games than the 4 × 4 games (M = 
45.61). There were no main effects of delay or information on confidence, and no two-way 
interactions, but a three-way interaction between delay, information, and matrix size, 
depicted in Figure 6, was significant, F(2, 382) = 3.43, p = .03, ηp2 = .02 (small). This 
interaction suggests that the greater decision confidence in 2 × 2 games, relative to 3 × 3 and 
4 × 4 games, was less pronounced for players who were informed that the Player II types 
were equally likely and who expected a delay than in all other treatment combinations. 
 
 
Figure 6. The three-way interaction of Delay × Information × Matrix Size for confidence 
scores. 
 
To compare the confidence of players choosing the known-risk and the ambiguous 
options, we computed the mean confidence ratings separately for each type of choice. There 
were 21 players who never chose the ambiguous option, and 12 who never chose the known-
risk option, and these players were treated as missing data for the following analysis. 
Decision confidence for known-risk option choices (M = 48.13) was not significantly 
different from confidence for ambiguous option choices (M = 47.22), t(161) = 0.82, p = .41, 
ns. Furthermore, players’ confidence in their known-risk choices correlated highly with their 
confidence in their ambiguous choices, r(162) = .69, p < .001, in line with research 
suggesting the existence of a general cognitive trait of confidence (West & Stanovich, 1997). 
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Figure 7. Choices of known-risk and ambiguous versions of nine games with distributions of 
possible co-player types equally likely or completely unknown (any distribution). 
 
We compared self-rated confidence of players choosing known-risk options, on a game-
by-game basis using t tests, with confidence of players choosing ambiguous options, but no 
significant differences were found in any of the nine games. The mean confidence across all 
nine choices was computed and correlated with the number of times the ambiguous option 
was chosen, but no significant association was found, r(195) = .08, p =.26, ns. 
 
Discussion 
The data reported in this article establish clearly that ambiguity aversion influences 
interactive decision making. This suggests that ambiguous games constitute a meaningful 
class worthy of special consideration in behavioural and psychological game theory and 
research. The findings confirm our major hypothesis and appear to provide the first empirical 
evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion – ambiguity aversion in the context of strategic 
games. 
The ambiguity aversion effect was strongest in the conditions in which participants, 
taking the role of Player I, did not know that their possible co-player types were all equally 
likely. In individual decision making, ambiguity aversion has been shown to occur even when 
such second-order probabilities are supplied (e.g., Rode, et al., 1999), but the degree of 
ambiguity is clearly greater without this information, and we therefore hypothesized, and 
found, significantly greater ambiguity aversion in the truly ambiguous conditions in which 
the players did not know the probabilities. This finding is consistent with our uncertainty 
intolerance hypothesis, according to which ambiguity aversion is caused by pessimism in the 
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 face of uncertainty, leading to loss of decision confidence. Uncertainty was obviously greater 
when the probability information was lacking, and it may explain the significant information 
effect. In the uninformed (equally-likely) conditions, a highly significant ambiguity aversion 
effect occurred in seven of the nine games. In Game 1, the effect failed to attain significance, 
although the difference was in the direction of ambiguity aversion, and in Game 5 the known-
risk and ambiguous options were almost equally preferred. Overall, in the uninformed (any 
distribution) conditions, the mean effect size was similar to what has been found in 
investigations of ambiguity aversion in individual decision making. 
The slightly anomalous result for Game 5 cannot be explained in terms of presentation 
order (because order was fully counterbalanced) or positional properties, such as the fact that 
in this game Player I’s payoff in the salient top-left cell is maximal, because the arrangements 
of rows and columns in the payoff matrices were systematically rotated. Game 5 is quite 
complex, inasmuch as there are three rows and columns and Player II’s indifference between 
strategies in the known-risk version is not modelled by a simple constant payoff function. 
However, some of the games that yielded significant ambiguity aversion effects were even 
more complex than this; for example, there was a four-strategy game (Game 8) in which 
Player II’s indifference between strategies in the known-risk version was modelled in the 
same way as in Game 5, and it yielded a highly significant ambiguity aversion effect (see 
Table 1). Game 5 elicited slightly atypical choice behaviour that is inexplicable in terms of 
any properties of the game itself, and we therefore attribute it to a random fluctuation in the 
data. 
The significant Delay × Information interaction, depicted in Figure 5, indicates that the 
difference in ambiguity aversion between participants who knew that their co-player types 
were equally likely and those who did not was significant only for players who expected a 
delay between their decisions and the prize lottery and possible cash payments. It appears 
from Figure 5 that the anticipation of a delay caused players who knew the probabilities of 
Player II types, but not those who did not, to become relatively ambiguity-seeking. This may 
have been a side-effect of the well-known phenomenon of time discounting of utilities 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Events that are expected to be delayed tend 
to have diminishing utilities, other things being equal. The aversive effects of uncertainty are 
therefore also likely to be reduced for events that are expected to be delayed, and this may be 
what partially dissolved the ambiguity aversion effect. If this interaction is replicated in 
future research, it might be interpreted as an indication that decision makers are more willing 
to choose speculative prospects when there is a delay between decisions and outcomes, but 
 only for prospects that include an element of calculated risk, rather than a complete shot in 
the dark. 
Our hypothesis that delay would increase ambiguity aversion was not corroborated by the 
data. We predicted a main effect of delay, because the aversive effects of uncertainty that are 
assumed in our uncertainty intolerance hypothesis are prolonged when the outcome is 
delayed. It is worth noting, however, that the manipulation of delay was not very strong. The 
version of the random lottery incentive system that we used meant that the players knew that 
they were unlikely to be affected by the delay, because they were unlikely to win the prize. 
Perhaps a stronger manipulation of time delay would expose greater ambiguity aversion in 
the face of anticipated delay. We do not feel that our data warrant a decisively negative 
conclusion on this point. 
The small but significant effect of matrix size appears puzzling at first. Ambiguity 
aversion was significantly less in 3 × 3 games than in 2 × 2 games or 4 × 4 games. Bearing in 
mind that only three games of each size were used in the experiment, we believe that this was 
a side-effect of the anomalous behaviour of Game 5, which happened to be a 3 × 3 game and 
failed to elicit significant ambiguity aversion. Whatever explains the lack of significant 
ambiguity aversion elicited by Game 5 – possibly nothing more than chance – presumably 
also explains the matrix size effect. 
The large effect of matrix size on self-rated decision confidence is hardly surprising. 
Confidence was significantly higher in 2 × 2 games than in 3 × 3 games or 4 × 4 games. The 
effect was probably due to the fact that 2 × 2 games are relatively simple and easier to 
analyze and understand than larger games. This, too, is consistent with our uncertainty 
intolerance hypothesis, because, other things being equal, uncertainty and pessimism are 
clearly least in the smallest and simplest games. The significant three-way interaction 
between delay, information, and matrix size shown in Figure 6 suggests that the greater 
decision confidence in 2 × 2 games, relative to the larger games, was less pronounced, 
relative to all other treatment combinations, for players who were informed that the Player II 
types were equally likely and who expected a delay. Perhaps the knowledge of the 
probabilities of Player II types undermined the participants’ confidence that they had chosen 
the best options in the 2 × 2 games, because in such small games, with only two Player II 
types known to be equally likely, the ambiguous option was hardly more ambiguous than the 
known-risk option, and this, coupled with the time-discounted utilities resulting from the 
anticipated delay, may have reduced the players’ confidence that they had chosen the best 
option. 
 Among players’ who chose both known-risk and ambiguous options, self-rated 
confidence was highly correlated (r = .69), in line with research suggesting the existence of a 
general cognitive trait of confidence (West & Stanovich, 1997). Confidence in known-risk 
options was not significantly greater than confidence for ambiguous options. We do not 
believe that this finding contradicts our uncertainty intolerance hypothesis, because 
participants were free to choose a known-risk or an ambiguous version of every game. 
According to our interpretation, participants are motivated to avoid ambiguous options 
precisely when – in fact, because – their confidence is undermined by the uncertainty 
involved in such a choice. Under conditions of selective exposure to known-risk and 
ambiguous game options, we should expect players to choose ambiguous options only when 
the uncertainty associated with such choices does not markedly depress their confidence. 
The most important conclusion of this research is that ambiguous games have behavioural 
and psychological characteristics that distinguish them from the known-risk games on which 
the entire edifice of orthodox game theory is based. In several of the games studied in this 
experiment, strategy choices differed significantly between the known-risk and ambiguous 
versions of the games. It is difficult to provide a reasoned interpretation of these differences, 
because the games were all designed to avoid equilibrium and other features that might guide 
players to rational solutions, and because the known-risk and ambiguous options were 
strategically equivalent in orthodox game-theoretic terms, but this finding confirms that 
players do not respond to strategic ambiguity by simply converting it to risk. A majority of 
players manifested strategic ambiguity aversion when choosing between ambiguous and risky 
games. When given the option to avoid ambiguity many people tend to take it. It is worth 
noting, however, that ambiguous options were chosen in a large minority of cases. Bearing in 
mind that research into individual decision making has also found that decision makers vary 
in their individual responses to ambiguity, this is just one promising avenue of further 
investigation in behavioural or psychological game theory. 
Above all, the data presented in this article have opened up a new avenue of research that 
could be pursued by behavioural game theorists and also by decision researchers who are 
interested in understanding ambiguity aversion in a wider context. 
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 Appendix: Basic Games Used in Experiment (Known-Risk Options Top, Ambiguous 
Options Bottom). 
 
Game 1 
 
8, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 8, 4 
 
8, 4 0, 0   8, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 8, 0   0, 0 8, 4 
 
Game 2 
 
6, 6 2, 2 
2, 2 6, 6 
 
6, 4 2, 2   6, 2 2, 4 
2, 4 6, 2   2, 2 6, 4 
 
Game 3 
 
0, 3 6, 3 
6, 3 0, 3 
 
0, 3 6, 0   0, 0 6, 3 
6, 3 0, 0   6, 0 0, 3 
 
Game 4 
 
9, 3 0, 3 0, 3 
0, 3 9, 3 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 3 9, 3 
 
9, 3 0, 0 0, 0   9, 0 0, 3 0, 0   9, 0 0, 0 0, 3 
0, 3 9, 0 0, 0   0, 0 9, 3 0, 0   0, 0 9, 0 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 0 9, 0   0, 0 0, 3 9, 0   0, 0 0, 0 9, 3 
 
 Game 5 
 
5, 3 1, 2 3, 2 
3, 4 5, 3 1, 4 
1, 2 3, 4 5, 3 
 
5, 4 1, 3 3, 2   5, 3 1, 2 3, 4   5, 2 1, 4 3, 3 
3, 4 5, 3 1, 2   3, 3 5, 2 1, 4   3, 2 5, 4 1, 3 
1, 4 3, 3 5, 2   1, 3 3, 2 5, 4   1, 2 3, 4 5, 3 
 
Game 6 
 
12, 4 0, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 12, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 4 12, 4 
 
12, 4 0, 0 0, 0   12, 0 0, 4 0, 0   12, 0 0, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 12, 0 0, 0   0, 0 12, 4 0, 0   0, 0 12, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 0 12, 0   0, 0 0, 4 12, 0   0, 0 0, 0 12, 4 
 
Game 7 
 
16, 4 0, 4 0, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 16, 4 0, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 4 16, 4 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 4 0, 4 16, 4 
 
16, 4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0   16, 0 0, 4 0, 0 0, 0   16, 0 0, 0 0, 4 0, 0   16, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 16, 0 0, 0 0, 0   0, 0 16, 4 0, 0 0, 0   0, 0 16, 0 0, 4 0, 0   0, 0 16, 0 0, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 0 16, 0 0, 0   0, 0 0, 4 16, 0 0, 0   0, 0 0, 0 16, 4 0, 0   0, 0 0, 0 16, 0 0, 4 
0, 4 0, 0 0, 0 16, 0   0, 0 0, 4 0, 0 16, 0   0, 0 0, 0 0, 4 16, 0   0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 16, 4 
 
Game 8 
 
7, 3 1, 4 3, 2 5, 1 
5, 4 7, 1 1, 3 3, 4 
3, 1 5, 2 7, 4 1, 3 
1, 2 3, 3 5, 1 7, 2 
 
7, 4 1, 3 3, 2 5, 1   7, 1 1, 4 3, 3 5, 2   7, 2 1, 1 3, 4 5, 3   7, 3 1, 2 3, 1 5, 4 
5, 4 7, 3 1, 2 3, 1   5, 1 7, 4 1, 3 3, 2   5, 2 7, 1 1, 4 3, 3   5, 3 7, 2 1, 1 3, 4 
3, 4 5, 3 7, 2 1, 1   3, 1 5, 4 7, 3 1, 2   3, 2 5, 1 7, 4 1, 3   3, 3 5, 2 7, 1 1, 4 
1, 4 3, 3 5, 2 7, 1   1, 1 3, 4 5, 3 7, 2   1, 2 3, 1 5, 4 7, 3   1, 3 3, 2 5, 1 7, 4 
 
 Game 9 
 
12, 3 0, 3 0, 3 0, 3 
0, 3 12,3 0, 3 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 3 12, 3 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 3 0, 3 12, 3 
 
12, 3 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0   12, 0 0, 3 0, 0 0, 0   12, 0 0, 0 0, 3 0, 0   12, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 3 
0, 3 12, 0 0, 0 0, 0   0, 0 12, 3 0, 0 0, 0   0, 0 12, 0 0, 3 0, 0   0, 0 12, 0 0, 0 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 0 12, 0 0, 0   0, 0 0, 3 12, 0 0, 0   0, 0 0, 0 12, 3 0, 0   0, 0 0, 0 12, 0 0, 3 
0, 3 0, 0 0, 0 12, 0   0, 0 0, 3 0, 0 12, 0   0, 0 0, 0 0, 3 12, 0   0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 12, 3 
 
Note. In the versions presented to participants, the positioning of known-risk options, shown above the 
ambiguous options in every case here, was counterbalanced, half the participants seeing each known-risk option 
above the ambiguous option and half seeing the ambiguous option above the known-risk option in each case. In 
addition, the rows and columns of the matrices were systematically transposed to control for positional and 
labelling effects, and the games were presented to participants in randomized order to control for order effects. 
The payoffs represent pounds sterling.  
 
